The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in the case of Spead v. Tomlinson unequivocally sustains the legitimacy of Christian Science practice, and in so doing falls into line with the courts of other states in which the rights of Christian Scientists have been at issue. All question of the legal right of Christian Scientists to practise the healing methods of their religion is definitely settled by this decision, although the case is still pending upon a minor question of fact which a jury must decide.

Because of this decision of the Supreme Court, the further progress of the case is shorn of importance except to the immediate parties to the suit.

Mr. Tomlinson and his counsel are to be congratulated upon their success in the most vital branches of this law-suit.

The following is a brief summary of the case and of the decision recently handed down:—

"On Tuesday, October 6, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire handed down an opinion in the case of Spead v. Tomlinson, upholding the right of Christian Science practitioners to treat disease. As an authoritative declaration of the law by the highest legal tribunal of Mrs. Eddy's home state, the court's decision is of unusual interest to Christian Scientists.

"The case has been in the New Hampshire courts for three years, and an account of the importance of the questions involved, as well as the attacks made by the plaintiff's counsel upon Christian Science, it has attracted much public attention and been widely noticed by the press. The defendant, Rev. Irving C. Tomlinson, is First Reader of First Church of Christ, Scientist, of Concord, N. H., and a Christian Science practitioner. In November, 1899, the plaintiff went to him to be treated for appendicitis, but abandoned the treatment four days later, and subsequently sued Mr. Tomlinson for damages which she claimed to have sustained by reason of the treatment. The writ contained three counts. The first count charged that the defendant guaranteed a cure; the second, that he was guilty of malpractice and negligence; the third, that the plaintiff was deceived by him when she went to him for aid. At the first trial, which took place at Concord in October, 1901, the Superior Court ordered a verdict for the defendant upon the first count, but submitted the second and third counts to the jury, who disagreed. The case was again tried on the second and third counts in April, 1902, when the Superior Court ruled that the plaintiff's own evidence would not justify a verdict in her favor, and took both counts from the jury. From this ruling the plaintiff took an appeal to the Supreme Court.

"In both the lower and the upper courts, the plaintiff's attorneys contended that the methods of the 'regular' schools of medicine were the only ones sanctioned by law for the treatment of disease, that every person who held himself out to the public as a healer must conform to those methods, and that the employment of Christian Science methods by the lefendant was in itself negligence and malpractice. They further contended that, if the use of prayer alone as a means of healing were not malpractice, the moment the practitioner endeavored to encourage his patient actively to resist disease he invaded the domain of medicine and became bound to employ ordinary medical methods. But the contention made by them which attracted the greatest public attention and disapproval was that Christian Science is a manifest fraud, and that any person who puts forward its doctrines is guilty of deceit. If either of these claims had been sustained by the courts, the practice of Christian Science in New Hampshire would have been rendered impossible.

"The decision just rendered is an emphatic answer to the above claims. The court held that Christian Science, not medicine or surgery, is the legal standard of the propriety of the methods of treatment employed by a person who holds himself out as a Christian Science practitioner and does not profess to be a physician or surgeon. They say that the conduct of Mr. Tomlinson in encouraging the plaintiff to resist the disease and move about does not subject him to liability in the absence of proof that it tended to impair the efficacy of the Christian Science treatment. They declare that 'we cannot say as a matter of law that Christian Science is a humbug.'

"The following excerpts from the opinion show the reasoning of the court with respect to the duty of Christian Science practitioners:—

" 'A person who offers his services to the community generally, or to an individual, for employment in any professional capacity as a person of skill, contracts with his employer that he possesses that reasonable degree of learning, skill, and experience which is ordinarily possessed by professors of the same art or science. . . . The law does not require that he should exercise the skill he is known not to possess, or the particular art or employment to which he does not belong, and in which he does not pretend to be skilled. . . . The law does not require a man to accomplish more than he undertakes, nor in a manner different from what he professes.'

" 'The plaintiff knew the treatment which the regular school of physicians would prescribe for appendicitis, and that the defendant was not a physician of that school and did not practise according to its methods, but was a Christian Scientist, and practised according to the methods recognized by such healers. Under these circumstances, a jury could not find that the defendant undertook to treat the plaintiff according to the methods of the regular school of physicians, or that he held himself out as possessing the knowledge and skill of the practitioners of that school. . . . What the parties mutually expected was that the defendant would treat the plaintiff according to Christian Science methods; and it necessarily follows that the defendant, in the treatment of the plaintiff, is to be judged by the standard of care, skill, and knowledge of the ordinary Christian Scientist.'

"While the decision is a complete victory for Christian Science upon the main questions involved, it unfortunately does not terminate the particular litigation. The plaintiff testified that the defendant made most sweeping assurances that she could and would be cured by him; and while Mr. Tomlinson earnestly denies this, the jury is the tribunal which must determine the credibility of witnesses; and the court, as the case stood, could not declare the plaintiff's statement untrue. According to the law in some states, a person may be held liable in the form of action technically known as 'deceit' if he makes, as of certain knowledge, a statement which he honestly believes to be true but does not certainly know. On this ground, the court held that it was open to the plaintiff to try before a jury the single question whether the defendant made the alleged statements, and in the form of positive and unqualified assurances rather than expressions of opinion, but without certain knowledge of their truth." M.